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PROPENSITY EVIDENCE IN VICTORIA: A TRIUMPH
FOR JUSTICE OR AN AFFRONT TO CIVIL LmERTIES?
KENNETH J ARENSON'
[Sections 398A and 372(3AA) and (3AB) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Wc). instned by way of the
Crimes (Amendment) Act 1997 (Wc), purport tD institute radical changes to the prt~existing
comnwn law doctrine regarding the admissibility of 'similar fact evidence' in criminal prosuutions.
The discussion to follow will examine the construction accorded this legislation by the Court of
Appeal in R v Best and R v Bullen. In particular, the discussion will address the question of
whether this legislation. as presently construed. npresents a triumph for justice or merely an
integral component ofa ~ell·conceived plan to entLlSculatt civil liberties under the pretext of a 'get
tough on law and order' campaign.}
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I INTRODUCTION
There are few who would disagree with the statement that the common law
rules. governing the admissibility of so-called 'similar fact evidence' are among
the most esoteric and hotly debated of our time. This is exemplified in many
ways, not the least of which is that jurists, academics and practitioners have yet to
so much as agree on a definition of what 'similar fact evidence' is. l As one might
expect. the complexity and controversy surrounding this topic have engendered
more than their fair share of commentary among members of the legal profession.
The discussion to follow, therefore, is not intended as yet another attempt to trace
the evolution of the common law prohibition against 'similar fact evidence',
much less reconcile the seemingly endless number of contradictory court
decisions and views which have permeated this troubled area of the law. Instead, ..
our attention will focus primarily on ss 398A and 372(3AA) and (3AB) of the
• Senior Lecturer in Law, Deakin University.
I Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461. 464-5; P K Waight and C R WiUiams, Evidence:
Co~ntary and Materials (5th ed. 1998) 422; J R S Forbes, Similar Facts (1987) 1-2; Andrew
ligertwood. Australian Evidence (3ld eel. 1998) 99-113; J 0 Heydon. Cross on Evidence (Sib.
A"51 od. 1996) 553-7.
263
264 Melbourne University Law Review [Vo123
Crimes Act /958 (Vic), inserted by way of the Crimes (Amendment) Act /997
(Vic), and their impact upon the 'similar fact evidence rule' under present
common law doctrine, In particular, the discussion will address the question of
whether this new legislation represents a positive step in the eternal quest for a
more fair and effective system of justice, or merely an integral component of a
well-conceived plan to emasculate civil liberties under the guise of a 'get tough
on law and order' campaign, In pursuit of these objectives, it is appropriate to
begin with a truncated discussion of both the nature of 'similar fact evidence' and
the existing common law rules governing its admissibility as expressed through a
series of High Court decisions, ,
II THE NATURE OF 'SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE'
As noted above, there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes
'similar fact evidence', In Pfennig v The Queen,2 regarded by many as the
leading High Court decision on 'similar fact evidence',3 the majority wrote:
There is no one term which satisfactorily describes evidence which is received
notwithstanding that it discloses the commission of offences other than those
with which the accused is charged. It is' always propensity evidence but it may
be propensity evidence which falls within the category of similar fact evidence,
relationship evidence or identity evidence. Those categories are not exhaustive
and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The tenn 'similar fact' evidence is
often used in a general but inaccurate sense.4
Regrettably, the Court did riot endeavour to define the terms 'propensity',
'similar fact', 'ideRlity', or 'relationship' evidence, nor did it explain how or why
'[I]he term "similar fact" evidence is often used in a general but inaccurate
sense." In Rv Best,6 the foregoing passage was quoted with approval by the
Court of AppeaL? The Court then proceeded to subdivide 'propensity evidence'
into 'similar fact' and 'relationship' evidence, but likewise failed to define these
terms or offer any guidance as to how they differ from one another. g Moreover, a
cursory review of the work of some of the leading text writers and other re-
spected authorities on the law of evidence indicates a similar lack of harmony in
defining 'propensity' and so-called 'similar fact evidence',' So then what do the
terms 'propensity' and 'similar fact' evidence denote?
Although the terminology varies somewhat among Ihe reported cases and
leading writers on this subject, it is clear that however 'similar fact evidence' is
defined, it constitutes a species of a broader category of evidence known as
2 (1995) 182 CLR 461 ('Pfennig'),
3 See, ego Waighl and Williams, above ni, 428.
4 Pftnnig (1995) 182 CLR 461. 464-5 (Mason Cl. Deane and Dawson JJ).
5 Ibid 465.
6 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria. Court of Appeal. Phillips CJ. Callaway and Bu-
chanan JJA, 23 July 1998) ('Bt!st').
7 Ibid 3.
8 Ibid.
9 See above n 1.
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'propensity',1O 'character',ll or 'disposition'i2 evidence. Each of these terms.
have been used to describe evidence which, if accepted, shows that a person has a
'continuing propensity to behave in some way or with some state of mind' ,13
Although these terms are often used interchangeably, the term 'propensity' shall
be used for the remainder of our discussion for convenience purposes. Consonant
with this definition, when an accused tenders evidence which shows that he or
she has a good reputation in the community for the relevant character trait
involved in the offence at issue, such evidence would fall under the rubric of
'propensity evidence'; the same would be true when a defendant in a defamation
action, in order to mitigate damages, tenders evidence that the plaintiff's general
reputation in the community for the relevant character trait was already poor at
the time of the defamatory statement. Although tendered as circumstantial
evidence of innocence in the former example and as direct evidence of poor
reputation in the latter, in" both instances the evidence, if accepted. shows a
continuing propensity to act in a particular manner or with a particular state of
mind.
A particular species of 'propensity evidence', which is hereafter referred to as
'similar fact evidence', 14 is any evidence of specitlj: conduct, normally discredit-
able in nature, which is of the same general character or shares some common
feature with the conduct which is the subject of the proceeding in question - and
which is tendered as circumstantial evidence of one or more of the constituent
elements of that conduct. If, for example, an accused has been convicted of one
or more offences having a highly unique modus operandi, there are circumstances
in which the conviction;i. are admissible as circumstantial evidence of the
accused's guilt of another offence committed with the same or very similar
modus operandi. Or, suppose an accused is on trial for knowingly possessing
cocaine with intent to sell. Assume that the accused admits possession but denies
knowledge on the basis of having never seen or used cocaine in the past. If the
accused has a conviction for illegal use of cocaine which predates his or her
alleged possession with intent to sell, it is likely that the prosecution can adduce
evidence of this conviction to rebut his or her claim of ignorance and prove the
requisite mens rea. While evidence of this type is most commonly referred to as
'similar fact evidence', the courts in particular have displayed a penchant for
using this term coterminollsly with others such as 'identity', 15 'tendency', 16
'dispositional'~ 17 'relationship', 18 and even 'propensity' .19 Recently, the Victorian
Parliament made its own contribution to the confusion in this area by employing
IQ Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 464-5 (Mason CJ, Deanc and Dawson 11).
II Ligertwood, above ni, 93-5.
12 Waight and Williams. above n 1.382.
13 Ibid.
14 Fortes. above n I. I.
15 Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 464-5 (Mason CJ. Deane and Dawson JJ).
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the broader term 'propensity evidence' in s 398A of the Crimes Act /958 (Vic) to
denote what has heretofore been regarded as classical 'similar fact evidence'.
Although the common law rules which govern the admissibility of 'similar fact
evidence' and their underlying rationale will be dealt with in Part Ill, suffice it to
say that this type of evidence, as with any type of 'propensity evidence', is
fraught with danger. One of the most obvious dangers, and one which varies in
degree depending on the facts, is that the fact-finder will erroneously conclude
that because a person has a tendency to behave or think in a particular manner, he
or she must have acted or thought in the same or similar manner on the occasion
which is the subject of the proceeding.2o
Before proceeding to an abbreviated exposition of the present common law
rules which govern the admissibility of 'similar fact evidence', two additional
points of controversy surrounding the nature of 'similar fact evidence' should be
noted. The first is that despite some occasional judicial indications to the
contrary,21 the tenn 'similar fact evidence' is not limited to conduct which is
criminal22 or even discreditable23 in nature. Although the vast majority of
reported cases involving putative error in admitting or receiving 'similar fact
evidence' have been concerned with disp~ted evidence consisting of prior
criminal acts,24 there is more than ample authority to support the proposition that
'similar fact evidence' encompasses all forms of conduct which meet the afore-
mentioned criteria.25 The second is that it is important to distinguish between
'similar fact evidence' and the evidentiary rule of exclusion under which evi-
dence of this type is presumptively inadmissible26 In. particular, it must be
emphasised that thivule of presumptive exclusion is applicable only in criminal
proceedings and operates only against the prosecution.27
III THE 'StMILAR FACT EVIDENCE RULE' UNDER PRESENT
COMMON LAW DOCTRtNE
Although the rule of exclusion most commonly referred to as the 'similar fact
evidence rule' appears to have originated in the early nineteenth century,28 there
is little doubt that the most influential decision in its evolution is that of the Privy
Council in Makin v A-G (NSW).2. In Makin, the defendants (husband and wife)
were convicted of murdering a baby boy whose body was found buried on their
premises. The prosecution's theory was that the defendants committed the murder
20 Ligertwood, above ni, 94; Waight and Williams. above n 1.426.
21 Makin vA-G (NSW) [1894] AC 57, 65. See also Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 464-5
(Mason Cl, Deane and Dawson H).
22 Heydon, above n 1, 566; Ligertwood. above ni, 110 fn 30.
23 Heydon, above ni, 567.
24 Fomes, above ni, 2-3.
25 Ibid 169-76; Heydon. above n 1, 604-8; Ligertwood, above n I, 170-5.
26 Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461. 483-5 (Mason Cl, Deane and Dawson H); Forbes. above n I, 34-
8; Ligertwood, above nI, 109-14.
27 Ligertwood, above n I. 110-32.
28 Heydon. above nI, 554.
2. (18941 AC 57 ('Maki.').
1999J Propensity Evidence in Victoria 267
as part of a comprehensive scheme whereby they would agree to adopt infants for
a nominal fee to be used for their care, all the while intending to kill the infants
and retain the monies for themselves. 30 The defendants' explanation was that the
child had died of natural causes and thus, their only crime was in disposing of the
body improperly.'l To rebut the defendants' claims and prove the requisite
elements of murder, the prosecution adduced evidence that 12 other infants had
been found buried on premises occupied by the defendants at various times,
several of which had been entrusted to them under a similar arrangement to adopt
and provide care for a nominal fee. 32 In fiolding that this evidence was properly
received, Lord Herschell wrote:
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evjdence tending
to shew that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those cov-
ered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the ac-
cused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have com-
mitted the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact
that the evidence adduced tends to shew the commission of other crimes does
not render it inadmissible if it be relev~nt to an issue before the jury, and it may
be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to consti-
tute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut
a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused. 33
The foregoing passage was regarded at the time as the most explicit statement
of what later became known as the 'similar fact evidence rule' of exclusion.34 So
influential was Lord Herschell's passage thaLit was adopted some 81 years later
by the House of Lords in DPP v Boardman J5 and continues to be cited with
approval in most, if not aH'; appellate court decisions in the United Kingdom and
Australia36 That acknowledgment notwithstanding, it must be emphasised that a
literal interpretation of Lord Herschell's formulation is inherently paradoxical
and difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the 'similar fact evidence rule'
under present common law doctrine. The paradoxical aspect of this formulation
was adroitly expressed by Andrew Ligertwood in the most recent edition of his
treatise, Australian Evidence:
(S]ubsequent generations of lawyers have sought to raise the statement of Lord
Herschell to the status of a definitive, virtually legislative, fonnulation of the
law. As commentators have shown. it just cannot stand up to such analysis. In
particular, if interpreted literally, the second sentence renders the first of no ef·
feet, for, taken literally, the second sentence admits all relevant evidence, not-
withstanding that it may be relevant only in showing the accused as the sort of
person likely to commit crime! Evidence revealing previous misconduct is not





34 Pftnnig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 475-6 (Mason Cl. Deane and Dawson 11); Forbes, above ni, 34-
8; Ligertwood. above ni, 109-14.
J5 [1975J AC 421.
36 See, eg, Pftnnig (1995) 182 CLR 461 and below n 38.
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avoid the literal contradiction of the Herschell formulation and to explain
when evidence disclosing other misconduct is admissible as an exception to the
rule.)7
Ligertwood's point is so critical to an acute understanding of the balance of our
discussion that further explanation is appropriate. The first sentence of Lord
Herschell's formulation purports to totally prohibit evidence of other criminal
misconduct if it is being tendered for the sole purpose of proving guilt through
what is commonly referred to as a propensity chain of reasoning. J8 In legal
parlance, a propensity chain of reasoning denotes a scenario in which the fact·
finder, assuming it accepts the evidence of other misconduct as truthful, is asked
to infer therefrom that the accused has a propensity to behave in a manner
consistent with that misconduct, from which it is then asked to draw an additional
inference that the accused is likely to have acted in a similar manner on the
occasion in question.39 Common sense dictates, and a plethora ·of appellate
decisions and scholarly writings confinn,' that evidence of other misconduct
which is of the same general character or shares some common feature with the
conduct at issue, does have logical relevance through a propensity chain of
reasoning.40 Bearing this thought in niind, the second sentence of Lord
Herschell's formulation declares that evidence of other criminal misconduct is
admissible if it is relevant to an issue which the jury must decide. Thus, a literal
construction of the second sentence renders the first sentence nugatory, and the
paradoxical nature of Lord Herschell's formulation becomes apparent.
Lord Herschell's passage is also problematic in that its literal interpretation
cannot be reconciled with the 'similar fact evidence rule' of exclusion under the
present common law doctrine in Australia. In illuminating this point, it is
noteworthy that prior to its decision in Pfennig, the High Court repeatedly cited
Lord Herschell's formulation in steadfastly adhering to the proposition that under
no circumstances could evidence of other misconduct be received as circumstan-
tial evidence of guilt through a propensity chain of reasoning41 With the passage
of time. however, the view began to emerge that many of the reported cases
upholding the reception of 'similar fact evidence' were explicable only on the
basis of a propensity chain of reasoning. 42 This view was eventually adopted by a
majority of the High Court in Pfennig43 A question then arose as to how this
view could be reconciled with the Court's additional pronouncement in Pfennig
that Lord Herschell's formulation continues to represent one of the guiding tenets
37 Ligertwood. above n 1. 100 (emphasis added).
38 See also ibid 94-5. 106-9; Waight and Williams. above n 1,423-5.
39 Ibid.
40 Pury v Th~ Quun (1982) 150 CLR 580. 585 (Gibbs Cl) ('Pury'); Harriman v Th~ Quun
(1989) 167 CLR 590, 597 (Dawsonl); Ligertwood, above n 1, 100; Waight and Williams,
above n 1.424.
41 Perry (t982) t50 CLR 580, 585 (Gibbs Cl); Sulton, The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528, 533
(Gibbs Cl); Harriman v Th~ Quun (l989) 167 CLR 590. 597-8 (Dawson 1).
42 Pury (1982) 150 CLR 580, 592-3 (Murphy 1); Ligertwood. above ni, 107.
43 Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461. 483-4 (Mason Cl. Deane and Dawson 11). 504-7 (Toohey J).
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of this common law rule of exclusion." This seemingly irreconcilable conflict
harkens back to Ligertwood's observation that '[c]onsiderable reinterpretation is
required to avoid the literal contradiction of the Herschell formulation and to
explain when evidence disclosing other misconduct is admissible as an exception
to the rule.'45 Ironically, the reinterpretation to which Ligertwood refers com-
menced in DPP v Boardman,46 the decision in which the House of Lords finally
adopted Lord Herschell's formulation, and continued throughout a long line of
High Court decisions which culminated in its landmark decision in Pfennig47
These' decisions have continually reco·gnised that in the context of criminal
prosecutions, 'similar fact evidence' must be handled with special care because of
its natural tendency to unfairly prejudice an accused's right to a fair trial. As
noted earlier, evidence disclosing conduct other than that with which an accused
is charged is fraught with many dangers, one of the most insidious being that the
fact-finder will erroneously conclude that because a person has a propensity to
behave or think in a particular manner, he or she must have acted or thought in
the same or similar manner on the occasion in question.48 Although not intended
as an exhaustive list, other possible dangers include the following: the evidence
may 'be accorded undue weight by the jury; the jip"y may conclude that despite
what may amount to reasonable doubt on the offences charged, the accused
nonetheless deserves to be convicted because he or she has committed other
misdeeds; and in instances where the accused is charged with multiple offences
such that evidence of each is admissible in respect of all the 'others, the sheer
number of weak allegations may cause the jury to find that at least one appears to
have been proven satisf,!>,torily49 At the same time, however, the foregoing
decisions have recognised that situations will arise in which the probative value
of 'similar fact evidence' will be so strong as to outweigh any prejudicial effect it
may have on an accused's right to a fair trial.50 In these instances. the decisions
have repeatedly held that consonant with Lord Herschell's formulation, 'similar
fact evidence' may be received." The quintessence of the judiciary's reinterpre-
tation of Lord Herschell's formulation, therefore, is a balancing of the probative
value of such evidence against its potential to unfairly prejudice the accused's
right to a fair trial."
While this approach is hardly impervious to criticism, it does afford a basis for
reconciling the literal conflict between the first and second limbs of Lord
Herschell's edict. Firstly, it emphatically underscores the point that notwith-
44 Ibid 480-1 (Mason Cl, Deane and Dawson JJ).
45 See above n 37.
46 [1975J AC421.
47 See Perry (1982) 150 CLR 580, 585 (Gibbs Cl); Sutton v The Quun (1984) 152 CLR 528, 533
(Gibbs Cl); Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590, 597-8 (Dawson 1); Hoch v The
Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 ('Hoch'); Thompson v The Quur! (1989) 169 CLR 1; Pfennig
(1995) 182 CLR 461.
48 See above n 20.
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standing the literal wording of the second limb, mere logical relevance to an issue
in the case will not exempt evidence which discloses· other misconduct from the
ambit of the first limb. Secondly, it comports welI with the fact that evidence
disclosing other misconduct is not excluded under the first limb because it lacks
logical relevance vis-a-vis an issue in the case. FinalIy, and despite what appears
on its face to be the clear import of the first limb, it leaves open the possibility
that evidence disclosing prior misconduct may be admitted in cases where its
relevance is predicated solely on a propensity chain of reasoning. On the other
hand, such an approach is open io criticism on the basis that it involves a
balancing process so similar to an exercise of the type of discretion used in
R v Chrisrie'3 ('the Chrisrie discretion') that its status as an evidentiary rule of
exclusion can be called into question. In order to withstand this criticism,
therefore, it was incumbent upon the judiciary to formulate articulable guide-
lines - a test of sorts - for determining when evidence disclosing other
misconduct reaches the threshold level where its probative value outweighs its
potential to unfairly prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial.
In Pfennig, the High Court not;only acknowledged this criticism, but endeav-
oured to formulate such a test. Succinctly stated, a majority of the Court held that,
before the prosecution can adduce evidence of 'similar facts' . the trial judge must
be satisfied that there is no rational (meaning reasonable) view of such evidence
which is consistent with innocence.54 In addressing this point, Mason Cl. Deane
and Dawson JJ wrote:
Because propensity evidence is a special class of circumstantial evidence, its
probative fors;e is to be gauged in the light of its character as such. But because
it has a prejudicial capacity of a high order, the trial judge must apply the same
test as a jury must apply in dealing with circumstantial evidence and ask
whether there is a rational view of the evidence that is consistent with the inno-
cence of the accused: Hoch (1988) 165 CLR at 296. Here 'rational' must be
taken to mean 'reasonable' ... and the trial judge must ask ... the question in
the context of the prosecution case; that is to say, he or she must regard the evi-
dence as a step in the proof of the case. Only if there is no such view can one
safely conclude that the probative force of the evidence outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect. And unless the tension between probative force and prejudicial ef-
fect is governed by such a principle, striking the balance will continue to re-
semble the exercise ofa discretion rather than the application of a principle.
In our view, the principles stated above which derive from Hoch correctly state
the law with respect to the admissibility of similar fact evidence ... The discus-
sion in Hoch was expressed in terms of evidence of similar facts rather than
propensity evidence ... because the evidence in that case lent itself to that clas-
sification.55
While the foregoing passages are a vivid reaffinnation of the continued contro-
versy surrounding the meanings to be ascribed to the terms 'propensity' and
'similar fact evidence', they also represent the High Court's most current and
53 Rv Chrisrit [1914] AC 545, 564; Ligertwood, above n I. 56: HeydoR, above n 1, 4.
54 PftTlTlig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 483-5 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson 11), 506-7 (Toohey J).
55 Ibid 483 (emphasis added).
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precise formulation of the 'similar fact evidence rule' of exclusion, There
remains, however, an extremely important corollary of this rule which must be
addressed before proceeding to Part IV of our discussion; namely, that the
prosecution is not permitted to invoke the rules of joinder as a means of circum-
venting the 'similar fact evidence rule',
The essence of the 'similar fact evidence rule' is that the prosecution is prohib-
ited, save for the exceptional circumstances enunciated in Pfennig, from adduc-
ing evidence of misconduct other than that which is covered by the indictment or
presentment, as circumstantial evidence of guilt.56 Strictly speaking, therefore,
the rule does nothing to prohibit the prosecution from charging an accused with
multiple offences in the same indictment or presentment, assuming, of course,
that joinder of the offences is permitted under the joinder rules of the State or
Territory in question. In Victoria, for example, the sixth schedule, rule 2 of the
Crimes Act /958 (Vic) provides that '[c]harges for any offences may be joined in
the same presentment if those charges are founded on the same facts or form or
are part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character'. This provision.
however, must be read in conjunction with:s 372(3) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)
which provides that: ,
[If] [b]efore trial or at any stage of a trial the court is of the opinion that a per-
son accused may be prejudiced ... in his defence by reason of being charged
with more than onc offence in the same presentment ... the court may order a
separate trial of any count or counts of such presentment.
Suppose, therefore, that an accused is· charged with one count of burglary and at
trial, the prosecution seek" to adduce evidence that the accused has committed
three other burglaries for which he or" she has never been tried, albeit with a
modus operandi which is quite dissimilar to the offence for which he or she is
presently charged. Assuming that this evidence is relevant solely on the basis of a
propensity chain of reasoning, it is clear that it would be excluded under the
Pfennig test. What is equally clear is that the 'similar fact evidence' rule would
be emasculated into oblivion if the prosecution could achieve the same objective
by opting instead to invoke the sixth schedule, rule 2 of the Crimes Act 1958
(Vic) as a means of joining all four counts in a single presentment. Cognisant of
this danger, the High Court has held that unless each of the offences joined would
be cross-admissible in a separate trial for any of the others, it is an abuse of
discretion resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice for a trial court to
refuse an application for separate trials - provided that a direction to the jury
would be inadequate to protect an accused from any unfair prejudice that may
result' from evidence relating to the other counts through an impermissible
propensity chain of reasoning.S7 In applying the test of cross-admissibility, each
of the offences sought to be joined assumes the character of 'similar fact evi-
56 Ibid 464-5 (Mason Cl, Deane and Dawson JJ); Heydon, above n 1, 566-7.
57 Sulton v Th~ Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528. 531 (Gibbs Cl), 541-2 (Brennan J); D~ J~sus v Th~
Qu". (1987) 68 ALR 1,4-5 (GibbsCJ), 9 (Mason and DeaneJl), 12 (Brennon!), 16 (Daw-
son J); Hoch (1988) 165 CLR 292, 294 (Mason Cl, Wilson and Gaudron JJ), 298 (Brennan and
Dawson 11).
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dence' and, as such, is subject to the 'similar fact evidence rule' of exclusion.
With this background in mind. attention will now focus on s 398A of the Crimes
Act 1958 (Vic), as construed by the Court of Appeal in Best," and its impact
upon the 'similar fact evidence rule' under present common law doctrine.
IV SECTION 398A AND tTS IMPACT tN THE AFTERMATH OF R V BEST
A The Deci~ion in Hoch v The Queen
In order to fully appreciate the impact of s 398A upon the 'similar fact evi-
dence rule' under present common law doctrine, it is appropriate to begin with an
analysis of the High Court's decision in Hoch.'9 In Hoch, the accused was
charged in a single indictment with three counts of sexual molestation of three
young boys who alleged that they had each been violated in a similar manner.
The accused made application for separate trials on the basis that the evidence
relating to each count was inadmissible under the 'similar. fact evidence rule'; in
essence, that each of the counts joined in the indictment would not have been
cross-admissible in a separate trial for aqy of the others·o In particular, the
accused claimed that an association among the boys. coupled with their animus
towards him, created a risk of concoction so substantial that the probative value
of the evidence was outweighed by its natural tendency to unfairly prejudice the
accused through a prohibited propensity chain of reasoning. The application for
separate trials was denied and the accused was convicted on all three counts. 61
The accused apP'?lled on the ground, inter alia, that the trial court erred in
refusing the application.
In allowing the appeal, the High Court formulated a test, later reaffirmed in
Pfennig, for determining when 'similar fact evidence' reaches the threshold level
where its probative value exceeds its potential to unfairly prejudice the accused
via a propensity chain of reasoning; namely, that such evidence must be excluded
if it bears any rational explanation which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused.62 In applying this test to the case before them, Mason Cl, Wilson, and
Gaudron 11 explained, citing the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in
DPP v Boardman,63 that the probative value of the disputed evidence is derived,
if at all, from the objective improbability that the three boys would provide such
similar accounts of the events at issue unless the events actually occurred; that is,
in circumstances such as these, it is fair to say that the accounts given must either
be true or, alternatively, have resulted from a collaborative effort to concoct, or
from pure coincidence.64 The justices further explained that in instances where
58 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal, Phillips CJ, Callaway and Bu-
chanan JJA. 23 July 1998).
59 (1988) t65 CLR 292.
60 Ibid 292-3.
61 Ibid 293.
62 Ibid 296 (Mason Cl. Wilson and Gaudron JJ).
63 [1975J AC 421.
64 Hoch (1988) t65 CLR 292. 295.
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the putative similar accounts are themselves in dispute. as in this case, the
probative value of the evidence is derived from the objective improbability of the
complainants having concocted similar lies65 Accordingly, the justices held that
where there exists a possibility of joint concoction, as here, the requisite degree
of objective improbability of similar lies is lacking and, consequently, there is a
rational view of the 'similar fact evidence' which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused.66
The approach formulated in Hoch and reaffirmed in Pfennig has received its
fair share of criticism67 One such criticism is that the Hoch-Pfennig approach
imposes an excessively strict standard for the admission of 'similar fact evi-
dence' 68 In particular, its opponents point out that it effectively requires trial
judges to make a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a condition-
precedent to its admissibility69 In view of the High Court's pronouncement in
Pfennigthat 'judge[s] must apply the same test as a jury must apply in dealing
with circumstantial evidence and ask whether there is a rational view of the
evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the accused' ,70 it is difficult to
find fault with this observation. As to whether this standard imposes an unduly
onerous burden on the prosecution, there are cog~t arguments for and against
this view. Opponents of the Hoch-Pfennig approach may raise a legitimate
question as to why the voluntariness of confessional evidence, for example. is not
determined by the same reasonable doubt standard as a condition-precedent to its
admissibility.7I This argument has considerable force when one considers that
confessional evidence is potentially more damaging, unreliable, and misleading
.than 'similar f~ct evidence';" This is especially true in the case of full confessions
which, unlike 'similar fact evidence', are direct evidence of guilt. On the other
hand, proponents of the Hoch-Pfennig approach can argue with equal force that it
is precisely for these reasons that questions regarding the voluntariness of
confessional evidence ought to be determined by the same strict standard
applicable to 'similar fact evidence'. The argument then follows that the analogy
posited by the opponents necessarily assumes, without justification, that the
present standard for detennining questions of voluntariness is the correct one.
Another criticism is that in certain cases where the similar facts are in dispute,
such an approach unjustifiably permits the trial judge to invade the province of
the jury in deciding issues of credibility." In cases such as Makin,7J for example,
65 Ibid.
66 !bid 296.
67 For criticisms of Hoch, see, ego Ligertwood, above n I, 119-20; Heyden, above n 1. 572-3; for
criticisms of Pfennig, see, ego Ligertwood, above ni, 109-11.
68 Ligcrtwood. above n I. 118-20.
69 Ibid. Although neither the court nor LigertWood expressly state the rule in terms of finding an
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a condition-precedent to the admission of 'similar
fact evidence'. the test set forth in Hoch effectively amounts to the same thing.
70 Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 483 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson 11).
7\ In Australia, the voluntariness of confessional evidence, as a condition-precedent to its
admissibility. is determined according to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities:
Wendo v Tht Quun (1963) 109 CLR 559; MacPhuson v Tht Quun (1981) 147 CLR 512.
72 Ligertwood, above ni, 119.
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where the similar facts are not in dispute, the Hoch-Pfennig approach merely
requires the trial judge to decide whether the inference of guilt to be drawn
therefrom is strong enough to exclude any reasonable hypothesis which is
consistent with innocence.74 In cases such as Hoch, however, the necessary
inference can only achieve this threshold if one can exclude the possibility that
the similarities in the accounts given by the boys were the result of collusion.75
Arguably, this involves an issue of credibility whieh should be left to the jury -
unless the trial judge finds that no reasonable jury could fail to find the presence
of collusion.76 Although Hoch did' n~t hold that trial judges are required to make
an ultimate determination as to whether collusion existed, a decision to exclude
the evidence does remove the issue of credibility from the jury's consideration.n
If the accounts given by the witnesses are so similar that they would bear no
rational explanation consistent with innocence but for the possibility of collusion,
what is the justification for taking the issue of credibility away from the jury? Is it
not fair to say that juries are routinely entrusted with this responsibility in other
contexts where the stakes are equally high? Is the possibiliry of collusion and its
pernicious consequences any less in cases where, for example, two or more
prosecution witnesses to the same event protvide accounts which are substantially
similar?
A final and perhaps most compelling criticism is that in cases such as Hoch,
there is nothing, save for honesty and integrity, to prevent an accused from
concocting an allegation sufficient to raise the possibility of collusion, thereby
depriving the jury of highly probative evidence. It is respectfully submitted that
5 398A was enacteg.. in large measure, to redress this problem. Thus, we now turn
our attention to s 398A, as construed by the Court of Appeal in Best, and its
impact upon the 'similar fact evidence rule' under present common law doctrine.
B Section 398A
By virtue of the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1997 (Vie), s 398A was inserted into
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Section 398A provides as follows:
398A. Admissibility of propensity evidence
(I) This section applies to proceedings for an indictable or summary
offence.
(2) Propensity evidence relevant to facts in issue in a proceeding for an
offence is admissible if the court considers that in all the circum-
stances it is just to admit it despite any prejudicial effect it may
have on the person charged with the offence.
73 [18941 AC 57.
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(3) The possibility of a reasonable explanation consistent with the in-
nocence of the person charged with the offence is not relevant to
the admissibility of evidence referred to in subsection (2).
(4) Nothing in this section prevents a court taking into account the
possibility of a reasonable explanation consistent with the inno-
cence of the person charged with an offence when considering the
weight of the evidence or the credibility of a witness.
(5) This section has effect despite any rule of law to the contrary.
In examining s 398A, three troublesome ambiguities are immediately apparent.
Firstly, although the section is titled, '398A. Admissibility of propensity evi-
dence', it fails to define the term 'propensity evidence'. As Victoria is a common
law jurisdiction. the assumption is that statutory terms are to be accorded their
common law meaning, if any, in the absence of a clear legislative intention to the
contrary." Applying this principle, s 398A would extend to any evidence which,
if accepted, shows that a person has a continuing propensity to behave in a
particular manner or with a particular state of mind, unless Parliament has
expressed a clear intention to the contrary~ This ra~ses a question as to whether
sub-ss (3) and (4), by virtue of their apparent rejection of the Hoch-Pfennig test,
constitute evidence of a clear legislative intent to limit the purview of s 398A to
'similar fact evidence' only. Another possible construction is that Parliament
inserted sub-ss (3) and (4) for the more limited purpose of rejecting the
Hoch-Pfennig test only in so far as the admissipility of the 'similar fact evidence'
species of 'propensity evidence' is concerned. A second ambiguity inheres in
sub-s (2) which declares that '[pJropensity evidence ... is admissible if the court
conside~s that in all th~ circumstances ifis just to admit it despite any prejudicial
effect it may have on the person charged with the offence.'79 With the apparent
repudiation of the Hoch-Pfennig test and the conspicuous absence of any
reference in s 398A to a balancing of probative value and potential prejudice,
upon what principled basis does a court determine whether the circumstances are
such that it is just to admit the evidence notwithstanding any prejudicial effect it
may have on the accused? Analogous to the argument adopted by the majority in
Pfennig, without specific guidelines for making this determination, the operation
of s 398A will be more akin to an exercise of discretion than an application of a
rule of exclusion.'o A third ambiguity arises, therefore, as to which of these
alternatives was actually intended by Parliament. This is an important distinction,
of course, both in terms of who bears the onus of proof on the question of
admissibility, and the standard of appellate review to be accorded the trial judge's
decision to admit or exclude the evidence. The principle that statutory ambigui-
ties in a common law jurisdiction must be resolved, in so far as possible, as
consistent with common law doctrine8! - strongly suggests that the law govem-
78 Bakery Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 120-4, 132 (DawsonJ); PeterOillies, Criminal Law
(4·ed, 1997) 8.
79 Crinus Act 1958 (Vie) s 398A(2) (emphasis added).
80 See Pfmnig (1995) 182 CLR 461, 483 (Mason Cl, Deane and Dawson 11).
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ing the admissibility of 'similar fact evidence' must be regarded as an evidentiary
rule of exclusion rather than an exercise of discretion. .
C R v Best
The Court of Appeal had its first opportunity to address these and various other
issues concerning the construction to be accorded s 398A in Best.82 In Best, the
applicant was convicted on six counts of indecently assaulting two young boys
and acquitted on twelve additional 'counts relating to three other young boys. The
applicant then appealed on several grounds, one being that the trial judge erred in
ruling that the evidence relating to each complainant was admissible as evidence
of the applicant's guilt in relation to each of the other complainants under
s 398A. Stated differently, the applicant argued that the counts relating to each
complainant would not have been cross-admissible in a separate trial for each of
the other complainants as 'propensity evidence' under s 398A and thus, it was
error and a substantial miscarriage of justice for the judge to refuse his applica-
tion for separate trials. It should be noted that at the time this case was appealed,
the common law rule of cross-admissibilitY,< at least in regard to 'sexual offences',
appeared to have been emasculated beyond recognition, if not abrogated alto-
gether, by sub-ss (3AA) and (3AB) of s 372 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vie), also
inserted by way of the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1997 (Vie). In the companion
case of R v Bullen,8J however, the Court arguably read these sections down to
such an extent as to render them ·meaningless. The Bullen decision will be
discussed in greater depth in Part V.
The judgment (if Callaway lA, with whom Phillips Cl and Buchanan lA con-
curred, emphasised at the outset that s 398A would Hotbe construed in accor-
dance with the explanatory memorandum or the Attorney-General's second
reading speech, but by giving its words their natural meaning in light of pre-
existing common law principles." Callaway lA then held that the term 'propen-
sity evidence,' as used in s 398A, denotes 'similar fact evidence' (as defined by
this writer in Part I1).ss Callaway lA then turned to the question of how trial
judges are to determine whether the circumstances are such that it is just to admit
'similar fact evidence' despite any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused.
Callaway lA concluded that sub-s (2) was intended to codify the English test of
admissibility enunciated by the House of Lords in DPP v p;86 namely, that
'similar fact evidence' is inadmissible unless its probative value is so substantial
81 See Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 120-4, 132 (Dawson J); Peter Gillies, Criminal Lllw
('",d,1997)8.
82 (Unreported. Supreme COUI1 of Victoria. Court of Appeal. Phillips Cl, CaIlaway and Bu-
chanan JJA. 23 July 1998).
83 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal, Phillips CJ, Callaway and Bu.
chanan HA, 23 July 1998) ('Bullen').
84 Best (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal, Phillips CJ, Callaway and
Buchanan JJA, 23 July 1998) 3.
85 Ibid 5-7. There are several passages in Callaway JA's judgment which, although not defining
'similar fact evidence' in the exact words used by this writer in Part H. can fairly be read as
consistent with that definition.
86 [1991] 2 AC 447.
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as to make it just to receive it notwithstanding its natural tendency to prejudice
the accused through a propensity chain of reasoning.87 This smacks of the same
amorphous balancing approach that for decades bedevilled the 'similar fact
evidence rule' by causing it to resemble an exercise of discretion rather than an
evidentiary rule of exclusion.88 Although the Hoch-Pfennig test was formulated
in part to redress this problem, sub-ss (3) and (4) purport to reject it in unequivo-
cal terms. Aware of this dilemma, Callaway lA concluded that sub-ss (3) and (4)
were also intended as a codification of English law; specifically, the principle set
forth by the House of Lords in R v H89 tl1at the process of balancing probative
value and prejudicial effect must be undertaken on the assumption that the
'similar fact evidence' is true.90 In further explaining the construction to be
accorded these sub-sections, Callaway lA wrote:
Sub-sections (3) and (4) should be understood to refer only to explanations, like
collusion and unconscious influence, that affect the truth of the propensity evi-
dence sought to be adduced and not to extend to explanations like coinci-
dence ... Sub-section (2) must be read in harmony with sub-ss (3) and (4), so
that 'all the circumstances' bearing on probative value and prejudicial effect are
relevant to admissibility but not factors impugning the reliability of the evi·
dence.91 t
It follows from this construction, therefore, that in cases such as Makin92 where
the similar facts are not in dispute, s 398A will have little or no effect on the
admissibility of 'similar fact evidence' under present common law doctrine. That
is to say that in these situations, sub-ss (3) and (4) will be inapplicable and the
admissibility of the evidellce will be determined according to sub-s (2) by a
balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect. It is only in cases such as
Hoch, for example, where the reliability of the similar facts is challenged on the
basis of collusion, unconscious influence, or some other means, that s 398A will
significantly alter the common law rules governing the admissibility of 'similar
fact evidence'. In these instances, sub-s (3) mandates that trial judges undertake
the balancing process required under sub-s (2) on the assumption that the 'similar
fact evidence' is true. If the trial judge concludes, based upon this assumption,
that the probative value is sufficiently great that it is just to admit the evidence
notwithstanding its prejudicial effect, then sub-s (4) permits the judge to direct
the jury that it may consider, in assessing the weight of such evidence or the
credibility of a witness, whether there is a rational view of the evidence which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused. Callaway JA further held, in
accordance with pre-existing common law doctrine, that where the reliability of
the similar facts is disputed on the basis of collusion, unconscious influence or
87 Best (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal. Phillips Cl. Callaway and
Buchanan HA, 23 July 1998) 4-5.
88 See Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 46t. 483 (Mason Cl, Deane and Dawson H).
89 [l995J 2 AC 596.
90 But (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria. Court of Appeal, Phillips Cl, Callaway and
Buchanan HA, 23 July t 998) 5. 10.
91 Ibid 10 (emphasis added).
92 [18941 AC 57.
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otherwise, the jury should be directed that they are prohibited from using such
evidence as part of their reasoning unless they are satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that none of these factors were operating.93
With the advent of s 398A, an accused in the position of Hoch can no longer
obtain separate trials by alleging, whether truthfully or not, that the complainants
collaborated to concoct allegations of an identical or similar nature. Rather, the
determination of cross-admissibility under s 398A is undertaken by assuming the
truth of the allegations and then balancing their probative value and prejudicial
effect. In the event that their probative value is so substantial that it is just to
admit them despite any prejudicial effect, the evidence is received and the issue
of credibility is left for the jury to decide. As noted earlier, this has the salutary
effect of preventing an accused·from fabricating allegations of collusion and then
invoking the Hoch-Pfennig test in order to remove the issue of credibility, as well
as highly probative evidence, from the jury's consideration. Also evoking
remnants of our earlier discussion is the following passage from the judgment of
Callaway lA:
It is entirely consonant with the common law as understood in Australia to
leave the reliability of evidence to a jury. They are able, and in some cases bet-
ter qualified, than a judge to assess the weight of an argument that evidence has
been concocted or is the product of unconscious influence ... That is also a
good deal fairer to the witnesses, whether the issue is detennined on the basis
of the depositions or after a voir dire.94
Although the judgment of Callaway 'lA affords substantial guidance in explicat-
ing the cryptic lajlguage of s 398A, it is conspicuously devoid of any attempt to
address the question of what, -if anything, remains of the Hoch-Pfennig test in
light of sub-ss (3) and (4). In balancing probative value and prejudicial effect on
the assumption that the similar facts are true, are judges now relegated to the pre-
Hoch-Pfennig era in which the balancing process, for want of any articulable
guiding principle, appears more akin to an exercise of discretion than a rule of
exclusion?95 Given the narrc?w construction accorded sub-s (3), is there any
language in s 398A which evinces a clear legislative intention to discard the
Hoch-Pfennig test as the ultimate measure of whether probative value outweighs
prejudicial effect? It would appear not. And in common law jurisdictions, is it not
true that in the absence of a clear legislative intention to the contrary, statutes are
to be construed in accordance with fundamental common law precepts?96 These
factors strongly suggest that the Hoch-Pfennig test is very much alive and that
s 398A significantly alters the pre-existing common law only to the extent of
sub-s (3)'s mandate that the Hoch-Pfennig test be applied on the assumption that
any disputed similar facts are true. This conclusion is not only consonant with the
93 Best (Unreported. Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal. Phillips Cl, Callaway and
Buchanan JJA, 23 July 1998) 20.
94 Ibid 11.
95 See Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461. 483 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ).
96 See Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 120-4. 132 (Dawson 1); Peter Gillies. Criminal Law
('-cd,1997)8.
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aforementioned common law precept, but comports well with the notion that in
the absence of the Hoch-Pfennig test or something similar, s 398A will indeed
resemble an exercise of discretion rather than an evidentiary rule of exclusion.97
Two final points are germane to our analysis of s 398A. The first is that the
judgment of Callaway lA never expressly resolves the issue of whether Parlia-
ment intended s 398A to operate as an exercise of discretion or a rule of exclu-
sion. However, Callaway lA's discussion of the meaning of 'propensity evidence'
for the purposes of this section militates strongly in favour of the latter alterna-
tive. In addressing this issue, Callaway lA opined that the type of 'propensity
evidence' to which s 398A refers involves an exclusionary rule which is directed
not merely at discreditable conduct, but with the impermissible manner in which
evidence of the conduct may be used.98 The second point is whether, in practical
terms, s 398A eliminates altogether the possibility that the Christie discretion
may be used to exclude evidence which survives the gauntlet of s 398A. The
expression 'practical terms' is used to underscore the reality that the Christie
discretion involves a balancing process similar to the type used in sub-s (2)99 and
thus, a decision to admit evidence under s 398A would be virtually dispositive of
the issue of the Christie discretion as well. In Bu/len, the judgment of Calla-
way lA, with whom Phillips Cl and Buchanan lA also concurred, expressly opted
to leave this question for another day. 100
V SUB-SECTIONS (3AA) AND (3AB) OF SECTION 372 OF THE
CRIMES ACT 1958 (VIe) AND-THEIR' IMPACT ON THE RULE OF
~ROSS-ADMIS SIB ILlTY
It was noted earlier that sub-ss (3AA) and (3AB) of s 372 of the Crimes Act
1958 (Vic) were also inserted as part of the Crimes (Amendment) Act 1997 (Vic).
It was further noted that these provisions must be read in conjunction with the
sixth schedule, rule 2, and s 372(3) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) which relate to
joinder and severance of counts charged in the same presentment respectively.
Sub-section (3AA) provides that '[dJespite sub-section (3) and any rule of law to
the contrary, if, in accordance with this Act. two or more counts charging sexual
offences are joined in the same presentment, it is presumed that those counts are
triable together.' Sub-section (3AB) then provides that '[tlhe presumption created
by sub-s (3AA) is not rebutted merely because evidence on one count is inadmis-
sible on another count.'
On its face, this new legislation purports to alter the pre-existing common law
rule of cross-admissibility in regard to sexual offences charged in the same
presentment. Specifically, it purports to create a rebuttable presumption against
severance which cannot be overcome solely on the basis that the evidence
97 Ibid.
98 B~sl (Unreported. Supreme Court of Victoria. Court of Appeal, Phillips CJ, Callaway and
Buchanan HA, 23 July 1998) 6.
99 See R \I Chris/j~ [1914] AC 545, 564; Ugertwood. above n 1, 56; Heydon. above n I. 4.
100 Bullen (Unreported. Supreme Court of Victoria. Court of Appeal, Phillips CJ. Callaway and
Buchanan HA. 23 July 1998) 16.
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relating to each count is not admissible in relation to each of the others. This
raises several important questions. Why is the legislation specifically targeted at
sexual offences? Under what circumstances will the presumption be rebutted? To
what extent, if at all, does the legislation really change the common law rule of
cross-admissibility regarding sexual offences?
In Bullen,lol the Court of Appeal addressed each of these issues. The judgment
of Callaway JA, with whom Phillips CJ and Buchanan JA concurred, initially
focused on the question of whether sub-ss (3AA) and (3AB) remove a judge's
discretion, pursuant to sub-s (3), to order that counts charged in the same
presentment be tried separately, at least in so far as sexual offences are con-
cerned. 102 Callaway JA held that the new legislation does not remove the
discretion, but establishes a prima facie rule governing the manner in which it is
to be exercised. 103 As a precursor to his discussion of which factors counsel the
exercise of this discretion, Callaway JA opined that the word 'triable', as used in
sub-s (3AA), 'means triable consistently with a fair trial of the accused."04 Also
noteworthy are Callaway JA's comments that '[s]ub-section (3AB) is unfortu-
nately expressed'lo, and 'I do not stay to consider whether "presumed" and
"rebutted" were the technically correct wo~s to use.' 106
In further construing sub-ss (3AA) and (3AB), Callaway JA turned his attention
to the rule of cross-admissibility and its underlying rationale.IO? In particular, he
explained that the rule has never been predicated on the notion that separate trials
should be ordered merely because evidence relating to each count is not admissi-
ble in relation to each of the other~.108 In further elucidating this rule, Calla-
way lA wrote: ~
The true position was, and remains. that where evidence on one count is admis-
sible on another. there is no point in ordering separate trials ... The prejudice to
the accused must usually be borne and mitigated, so far as possible, by appro-
priate directions to the jury. The significance of evidence on one count being
inadmissible on another count is that it makes it practicable to order separate
trials if there is reason to do so. The reason is not the inadmissibility of the evi-
dence but, in the case of sexual offences. the prejudice to the accused coupled
with a doubt about the efficacy of any warning against misuse of the evi-
dence. 109 .
Callaway JA then opined that while the rule is typically expressed in terms of the
cross-admissibility of 'counts', it has resulted in a rule of practice throughout
Australia whereby allegations of sexual offences involving two or more com-
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complainant is not admissible in relation to each of the othersI10 Callaway JA
further opined that this rule of practice has now evolved to the point where
applications for severance are now routinely granted1 II According to Calla-
way lA, the perceived 'mischief' at which these sub-sections are directed is the
all but automatic granting of such applications. The dilemma facing the Court,
therefore, was how to give effect to the intention of Parliament and, at the same
time, preserve a rule of practice which the judiciary regards as indispensable in
ensuring an accused's right to a fair trial. The inherent tension between these
considerations is exemplified in Callawa)' JA's concession that one or perhaps
both would have to be compromised 'in order to give practical effect' to the new
legislation.' 12 Callaway JA was also careful to point out, however, that '[n]either
consideration may ... be ignored or wholly displaced.' 113 That brings us to the
question of how the discretion conferred by sub-s (3) is to be exercised in the
aftermath of sub-ss (3AA) and (3AB).
In addressing this question, Callaway JA held that the interest in ensuring an
accused's right to a fair trial must be the paramount consideration in the exercise
of this discretion. '14 He further held, therefore, that applications for severance
should always be granted in cases where it is 'bot~ desirable and practicable in
order to ensure a fair trial." 15 While emphasising that one prerequisite of a fair
trial is that judges should take all reasonable measures to prevent the misuse of
evidence,"6 Callaway JA also acknowledged that juries will not always comply
with directions that are given to prevent such misuse and any resulting prejudice
to the accused. lI7 Callaway JA then opined that the risk of non-compliance is
unacceptably high in caseJ. where the evidence relating to one complainant is
probative but not admissible in relation·to the other(s);'18 this is particularly true
in the case of sexual and other aberrant offences which, because of their repulsive
nature, are calculated to inflame the jury.1l9 In concluding this segment of his
judgment, Callaway JA wrote;
It might be thought that there is a tension between s 398A and the amendments
to s 372. If tbe judge has already decided that the prejudicial effect of the evi-
dence ... against A is so great that it is not just to admit that evidence in rela-
tion to the offence against B, how can he or she not conclude that the same
prejudice that has led to the evidence being inadmissible also requires s~ver­
ance of the presentment? Experience may show that there are relatively few
110 Ibid 9. There is no reason in logic or principle, nor did Callaway JA suggest, that the rule should
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cases of that kind where separate trials should not be ordered. So much appears
to be recognized by the Attorney-General in ... her second reading speech. 20
The judgment of Callaway lA comes perilously close to an outright reaffirma-
tion of the rule of practice which Parliament perceived as pernicious enough to
warrant the remedial measures embodied in sub-ss (3AA) and (3AB). Although
the preceding passage leaves open the possibility that severance should be denied
in certain cases of this type, the conspicuous absence of any discussion of what
factors might justify that result does not augur well for the proponents of the new
legislation. For the same reason,'proponents should find little solace in Calla-
way lA's observation that the tension between s 398A and s 372 is not absolute in
the scenario postulated in the above-quoted passage. 121 The more likely inter-
pretation is that Callaway lA was merely adverting to the fact that severance is
only indicated under the common law rule when a direction to the jury would be
ineffective in preventing any unfair prejudice that may result from misuse of the
evidence. A fair reading of Callaway lA's judgment suggests that a cautionary
direction would only be effective where the evidence relating to one complainant
has absolutely no probative value In relation to the other(s).122 It is the opinion of
this observer, therefore, that the judgment o~Callaway lA does nothing more than
pay lip service to his earlier statement that legislative intent may not be 'ignored
or wholly displaced.' 123
VI CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that an effective system of checks and balances is an essential
component of any form of representative government. It is equally clear, at least
to this observer, that no system of checks and balances can be effective without
an independent judiciary armed with a meaningful power of judicial review.
Although the Australian judiciary is independent to the extent of its freedom from
direct electoral accountability, the absence of a Bill of Rights in the Australian
Constitution raises a serious question as to the efficacy of its power of judicial
review and, consequently, the efficacy of our system of checks and balances. It is
respectfully submitted that the enactment of s 398A and sub-ss (3AA) and
(3AB) - and the narrowing constructions accorded them by the Court of
Appeal - are a clear indication of the legitimacy of the foregoing propositions.
No purpose would be served in rehashing all the points raised during the course
of this article. Suffice it to say that Callaway lA's judgments in Best and Bullen
make it abundantly clear that the Court was prepared to ignore the 'purposive
construction of legislation'124 precept in the interest of ensuring an accused's
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would be construed by giving its words their natural meaning in light of pre-
existing common law principles - as opposed to relying on either 'the explana-
tory memorandum or the Attorney-General's second reading speech.' 126 Calla-
way lA expressed similar sentiments in Bullen when he intimated that 'the
purposive construction of legislation' precept might have to be subordinated to
the interest in ensuring the right to a fair trial. 127 Yet is it not black letter law that
in the absence of a state or federal constitutional provision to the contrary, the
courts must construe legislation in a manner which comports with the clear
intentions of Parliament?128 Although the'narrow construction accorded s 398A
in Best arguably represents an improvement over the pee-existing common law, it
is all but certain that it flies in the face of what Parliament intended. The same
can be said, with even greater conviction, of the construction accorded sub-
ss (3AA) and (3AB) in Bullen. How does one explain the rather obvious tension
between the legislative and judicial branches of the Victorian government?
With all due respect to Parliament, there is little doubt that the new legislation
was intended to emasculate the 'similar fact evidence rule' under present com-
mon law doctrine and thereby facilitate c"nvictions, particularly in cases involv-
ing sexual offences. While this was undoubtedly th~ politically correct course to
follow, it could not be reconciled with the common law right of an accused to a
fair trial. 129 Recognising this, and determined to frustrate Parliament's attempt to
run roughshod over basic civil liberties, the Court of Appeal resorted to a bit of
political chicanery of its own. Acutely aware of Parliament's affinity for political
correctness, the Court seized upon the reality that Parliament has not, and for '
political reasons would n'?J, statutorily abolish the common law right to a fair
trial. This effectively allows the courts to interpret legislation, irrespective of the
true intentions of Parliament, in a manner which is compatible with the courts'
notion of what constitutes a fair trial. The courts are saying, in substance, that if
Parliament had intended to abolish the right to a fair trial, it would have done so
expressly or by necessary implication. Since it has not done so, any legislation
which offends the notion of a fair trial can be flouted on the premise that Parlia-
ment could not have intended such a result. The consequence, of course, is that
the judiciary will continue to overstep its authority and act as a super legislative
body unless and until Parliament summonses the courage to clearly express its
true intentions. Although the results of such an arrangement may be equitable in
many instances, there is no escaping the fact that the doctrine of separation of
powers and its system of checks and balances are being stretched to their outer
limits. Moreover, can it be assumed that every Australian court will have the
determination, much less the desire, to safeguard the right to a fair trial? If the
126 Best (Unreported. Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal. Phillips 0, Callaway and
Suchanan JJA. 23 July 1998) 3.
127 Bull~n (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal. Phillips 0. Callaway and
Buchanan JJA, 23 July 1998) 12.
128 Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR I, 9; Peter Hanks,
Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Co~ntary(5 lJl ed, 1994) [3.053]-[3.058].
129 Dietrich v The Quun (1992) 177 CLR 292, 297-8 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), 331-2
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right to a fair trial were to be enshrined in an entrenched Bill of Rights in the
Australian Constitution, would this not reduce this type of strain on the separa-
tion of powers and its system of checks and balances? Would it not also serve to
preserve and enhance the integrity of our political institutions? Although the
answers to these questions will continue to be hotly debated, the extent to which
the new Victorian legislation brings these issues into focus cannot be ignored. Be
that as it may, does the new legislation, as construed in Best and Bullen, represent
a triumph for justice or an affront to civilliherties?
Although the answer to this question is largely in the eyes of the beholder,
certain observations can be gleaned from the foregoing discussion. In the
aftermath of Best and Bullen, the 'similar fact evidence rule' under the pre-
existing common law doctrine is substantially intact. Assuming that the
Hoch·Pfennig test is still the ultimate criterion in making the determination as to
whether the circumstances are such that it is just to admit the evidence under
s 398A(2), the only significant change is that the test must now be applied on the
supposition that the similar facts are true. In cases where the similar facts are in
dispute, this reform must be viewed as positive in at least three respects. The first
is that evidence which is sufficiently probative to satisfy the Hoch·Pfennig test,,
save for the possibility of collusion, unconscious influence or other factors
impugning its reliability, will no longer be excluded from the jury's considera-
tion. This restores the function of adjudging the credibility of witnesses to its
rightful place with the jury. The second is that an accused is thereby prevented
from fabricating· allegations of collusion, unconscious influence and the like in
order to deprive the jury of highly probative and damaging evidence. While it is
true that this will remove the option of severance and force an accused to face all
his or her accusers in a single trial, it does not necessarily follow that this is
inimical to the interests of justice. If the allegation of collusion or unconscious
influence has merit, and especially if it can be substantiated by credible evidence,
it may well be to the advantage of an accused to raise this defence in a single
trial. One obvious advantage is that it enables an accused to adduce the entire
arsenal of legally admissible evidence in support of his or her defence. Another
advantage is that it limits the prosecution to one opportunity to convict before a
single jury as opposed to several opportunities with different juries. If the
allegation of collusion or unconscious influence is spurious, the interests of
justice are hardly served by allowing the option of severance and depriving each
jury of the benefit of highly probative evidence of guilt. The third positive
consequence of the reform is that both the government and the accused will be
spared the cost and time of enduring multiple prosecutions.
For at least three reasons, therefore, the new Victorian legislation should be
seen as an improvement over the pre-existing common law doctrine regarding the
admissibility of 'similar fact evidence' in criminal prosecutions. To those who
agree with this statement and further subscribe to the view that the 'similar fact
.evidence rule' and the concomitant rule of cross-admissibility are essential
components of the common law right to a fair trial, the new legislation represents
a significant triumph for justice. It is regrettable that this triumph occurred in
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spite of the rather obvious intention of Parliament to mount a frontal assault on
civil liberties under the pretext of a get tough on law and order campaign.,
According to an old proverb, '[w]hen people start giving up a little liberty in
order to get a little more security, they will soon have neither.' We are fortunate
that the Court of Appeal has both the wisdom to understand this proverb and tIie
will to frustrate the efforts of those who do not.
